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 The Structure and Economic Impact of R&D Organisation 







   
R&D spending in New Zealand is a mixture of private and public investment 
undertaken to improve productive activity and efficiency. Investment is split 
fairly equally between private business, government organisations and the 
universities. It is a long term investment with some uncertainty about 
outcomes being achieved. It is predominantly a public good investment as 
most government organisations and universities are providers of R&D but 
not users of it and hence there is a discontinuity in the connection between 
investment and results. Furthurmore, the supply of R&D has properties of a 
free good which lead to users looking for new applications on a wider and 
wider front (spillovers).  For these reasons R&D is generally regarded as a 
`good thing’ rather than a solid investment vehicle.  Cost-benefit studies 
have shown, both in New Zealand and overseas, some projects with rates of 
return well in excess of the opportunity cost of capital, yet at the aggregate 
level there is a paucity of cost-benefit studies confirming such rates of 
return on a broader industry basis. This paper discusses some results from 
aggregate studies of the economic impact of R&D investment in NZ and 
suggests reasons why the links between aggregate supply of R&D and user 
demand are very weak. 
Key Words: Investment, R&D Expenditure, Social Benefits. 
 
Introduction 
A Little History 
 
By structural analysis, it is meant the institutional organisation of an industry may 
have some bearing on the impact of that industry on other industries. Institutional 
economics lays considerable stress on the relation between performance and 
structure. In the case of the science industry in New Zealand the institutions 
originally developed in a government-sponsored framework that some writers 
believe `crowded out „ private investment. Two large departments, the Department  
of Agriculture and the Department Scientific and Industrial Research, were created 
in a framework where it was thought individual producers could not afford to pay 
for research in their own interests. Even so, in the post-war years the DSIR was 
responsible for setting up a number of industrial research associations (DRI, WRO, 
MIRC) with joint funding from Government and industry. By reason of 
specialisation and skills, the universities were a separate institutional entity in the 
science industry, which largely drew on Government funding for this activity which 
was considered as a desirable adjunct of training in science on which they had a 
monopoly.  These relationships were changed by the reforms in the science 
establishment in the early 1990s which removed science from DSIR and MAF and 
                                                 
1  Consultant, Wellington (johnsonr1@paradise.net.nz) created a series of subject research institutes (AgResearch etc) with private 
company charters. At the same time the Ministry of Research, Science and 
Technology (MoRST) was established as the policy body responsible for science 
and the Foundation of Research Science and Technology (FRST) was established as 
the funding body for government funds with a mandate to organise science funding 
on a competitive bidding process (Johnson 2000). 
 
Measurement of Effort 
 
Another aspect of these reforms was an endeavour to find out how much exactly 
was spent on both private and public R&D. This task was entrusted to MoRST and 
started in the 1989 expenditure year. The survey was taken over by Statistics New 
Zealand in 2002. It is this survey which informs most of the comments and analysis 
presented in this paper. 
 
Organisations which carry out R&D are called `research providers‟ and the 
organisations which finance research are called `research funders‟. Private sector 
providers are called `business‟ (BERD), government (GERD) and universities 
(HERD for higher education) and are both providers and funders as are business. 
`Providers‟ is the basis of all analytical tables used in this paper. The old research 
associations (DRI, WRO etc) are considered to be private providers of R&D. 
MoRST spent considerable effort in identifying `output class‟ areas which were 
categories based on the purposes of R&D used for public science funding ( MoRST 
Survey 1997, p. 27). Up to 2000, MoRST asked in the questionaires what output or 
outputs each firm/department/organisation was providing science services to? (I 
assume there was space for a mulpiple answer).  In research utilising the MoRST 
output area data, we reclassify these outcome categories to fit ANZSIC (industry 
classification). Statistics New Zealand classifies BERD by ANZSIC categories and 
GERD  by the appropriate ANZSIC categories This means that the meaning and 
intent of science output class areas has been put aside. 
 
In addition to the MoRST Surveys (1989-2004), earlier statistics of R&D spending 
were collected by The National Research Advisory Council (NRAC) and 
Government Departments. These figures were assessed under various subject areas 
which approximated roughly to the output areas used by MoRST. In this way 
spending statistics by the private sector, universities and Government were 
extended back to 1961-62  for the following industry sectors:  
  Agriculture 
  Fishing 
  Forestry 
  Processing 
  Manufacturing 
  Energy 
  Building&Construction 
  Transport 
  Other Services 
Market Sector (ie excluding owner-occupied dwellings and government 
services). 
 
 Cost-benefit Analysis  
The economic impact of R&D needs to be analysed in some benefit-cost 
framework. Earlier studies have included a study by Scobie and Eveleens of the 
agriculture sector where fairly clear records of research and extension  expenditure 
had been kept (Scobie&Eveleens 1986). This study related R&D expenditure to a 
total productivity ratio (gross return/total input) for the sector drawn from the work 
of B.P. Philpott (1969). The Scobie and Eveleens study of agricultural productivity 
from 1926 to 1984 used a model in which the observed level of total productivity in 
agriculture in each year was dependent on: 
# the weather conditions (as measured by an index of soil moisture deficits) in the 
previous year; 
# the level of spending on extension services; 
# the number of graduates and diplomats trained in the agricultural sciences 
(including horticulture, veterinary science, food technology) over the past 15 years; 
# the economic conditions of the agricultural sector (as measured by the annual 
deviation of net farm income from its long term trend); and 
# the real spending on agricultural research in that year, and in each of the 
preceding years (up to 30 years earlier). 
 
The results showed that, on average, research results are slowly incorporated [in the 
case of livestock farming] into practice and their impact on productivity increased 
reaching a peak after 11 years and finally tailing off after a total of 23 years. In 
terms of research expenditure alone [i.e. holding other variables constant], $1m of 
research expenditure generated total benefits of $8.5m over the following 23 years, 
giving an internal rate of return of 30 per cent. 
 
In agricultural circles, the total productivity ratio seems the obvious way to study 
production changes resulting from adoption of scientific procedures. On a wider 
industry basis, net output or value added is the statistical measure of production 
recorded. A productivity ratio like total factor productivity might then be employed 
(net output/weighted capital and labour inputs) for testing R&D impacts. If the 
underlying function adopted is Cobb Douglas then it may be relevant to make net 
output the dependent variable in the R&D analysis. Some of these variants are 
discussed later in the paper.  
 
It has to be said that these are aggregate industry studies dependent on national 
collections of statistics. Project level data or even programme level data (within an 
organisation) may be a more precise approach to cost benefit studies. 
 
R&D and the Stock of Knowledge 
 
The question remains as to where an industry obtains its R&D knowledge. A stock 
of knowledge is built up in continuing investment by public and private agencies 
both in NZ and overseas.  It could be that all knowledge is available to everybody 
and one just has to plug into it. Some industries may generate their own. Or is part 
of the stock of knowledge specific to particular users or industries or locked up by 
legal means such as patents?. The MoRST system of science output area classes 
suggests that  science users can be categorised in a useful way and R&D can be 
something specific to a group of users. This kind  of hypothesis can be tested by 
relating productivity gains in an industry to specific sets of R&D knowledge (organised around science output area classes) or the general body of R&D 
knowledge. If one industry draws from another industry this is a form of economic 
spillover. It is thus quite important to examine where a group finds its relevant 
R&D knowledge and to look for links between groups. 
 
Background Data Sets: R&D Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows R&D expenditure from a provider point of view since 1990. 
National expenditure on R&D has risen from $725m in 1990-91 to $1467m in 
2003-04. As can be seen, the amount has grown in line with the growth of national 
GDP. As far as the main providers are concerned, government has slowly 
withdrawn from research provision while the private sector and the universities 
have increased their share. 
 
Table 1: Research Expenditure by Major Providers 
(%) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
             1990-91 1991-92  1992-93  1993-94 1995-96 1997-98  1999-00 2001-02 2003-04 
 
Business    28.3  26.8  27.1  30.1  27.0  28.2  29.7  32.1  35.6 
Universities  27.8  28.6  30.8  28.3  30.7  36.4  34.2  33.3  31.0 
Government  43.9  44.6  42.1  41.6  42.2  35.3  36.0  34.6  33.4 
 
Total $m  724.6  714.5  755.3  824.8  889.3  1107.4  1091.3  1308.3* 1467.9* 
 
% GDP    0.99  0.98  1.00  1.03  0.98  1.10  1.01  1.06  1.07   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*  sample total adjusted to 2000 survey basis. 
 
Sources: MoRST 1999 Survey and Statistcs New Zealand Updates. 
 
Table 2 shows where the funds for R&D originate. Most university funds come 
from Government but not all of it (see Table 3). This table is presented to 
demonstrate the rising share of the private sector.  
 
Table 2: Funding of Providers of Science 
(%) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
    1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 2003-04 
 
Business    29.3  27.4  29.7  33.8  33.7  30.5  33.9  33.4  36.7* 
Government  60.3  61.8  59.0  54.8  52.3  52.3  50.9  49.3  56.5* 
Other    10.4  10.8  11.3  11.4  14.0  17.2  15.1  17.3  6.8* 
 
Total  $m  724.6  714.5  755.3  824.8  889.3  1107.4  1105.7  1329.9  1601.2* 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
* In 2000, 2002 and 2004 funding is not equalised with spending. In 2002 the matched sample is 
utilised. In 2004, the new sample is the only information available. 
 
Sources: MoRST 1999 and Statistics New Zealand. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3 shows University sources of funds for some recent years. These do not 
show in Table 2.  Government block grants predominate but the contractual system  
(FRST) is of growing importance and internally generated funds have remained at a constant proportion. There are not large linkages with business. In our econometric 
analysis, all University provider spending is treated as part of the Government 
sector.  
 
Table 3: Source of Funds for University R&D 
% 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
1993-94    1995-96  1997-98    1999-00    2001-02    2003-04 
 
General University funds    46      35        36            28             23  - 
Research contracts (Govt)   16      20        25         31             37  - 
Other funds (incl. student fees)  23      27        29         26             26  - 
Business         5       9         5           6               5  - 
Overseas       3       5         3           5               3  - 
Others         6       4         3           4               5  - 
 
Total  $m                                    233.5     273.5      403.5       374.1         435.8*       454.8* 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
  on the new sample basis. 
 
Source: Morst 1999 and Statistics New Zealand. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4 shows how the business sector funds its spending. This demonstrates, I 
think, the independence of the business R&D sector from the public sector, 
remembering the business sector includes the former research associations (WRO 
etc).  
 
Table 4: Sources of Funding for Private Sector 
(%) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
    1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 2003-04 
 
Business    88.9  87.8  88.6  89.4  86.4  79.3  83.8  76.4  77.3 
Government*  6.2  7.3  8.1  7.1  7.0  9.3  9.7  9.2  9.6 
Other#    4.9  4.9  2.3  3.5  6.6  11.4  6.5  14.4  13.2 
 
Total $m  204.4  191.7  204.8  247.9  240.3  312.5  326.2  423.5  648.1** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
* includes higher education 
# includes private non-profit funds and overseas funds. 
** based on 2004 sample 
 





Figure 1 shows the division of the R&D spending between the 3 main sectors in real 
terms since 1961. From 1989 the data is based on the MoRST surveys. For the 
intermediate years in which MoRST did not carry out a survey, the expenditure has 
been extrapolated in proportion to changes in nominal GDP. Prior to 1989, the 
NRAC data for Government expenditure is used. For Universities a fixed 
proportion of the Government Block Grant is used. For Business the proportion of 
business expenditure to nominal GDP in 1989 is carried back to 1961-62. 
 Real expenditure by Government was rising rapidly up to the early 1980s but has 
since plateaued with quite a reduction in real terms in the 1980s. The trend in 
University expenditure up to the late 1980s reflects the Block Grant allocation and 
is only a guide to actual R&D expenditure by the Universities. In the private sector  
the trend reflects  GDP growth and is only an approximation to what private 
enterprise might have spent on R&D. 
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Individual Industry Data 
 
The impact of R&D investment will be felt in the longer run in production levels 
and efficiency.  One approach is to observe production changes as reflected in real 
national product and seek explanatory changes in capital employed, labour 
employed and previous R&D investment.  
 
The two approaches are related. Both can be derived from a production function of 
the form: 
 
    Y =  A Ka Lb,               (1) 
 
where    Y is output: 
    A is productivity; 
    K is the stock of physical capital; and 
    L is labour.   
If productivity can be explained by the stock of knowledge capital and other factors, 
then equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
    Y = Ka Lb Rg  Zs,                                                              (2) 
where    R is the stock of knowledge capital; and 
    Z is other factors affecting measured productivity. 
 In the production function approach, a log linear version of equation (2) is 
estimated directly: 
  
       ln Y =  a ln K + b ln L + g ln R + s ln Z,                                   (3)     
 
with no further restrictions placed upon the parameters. The estimate of g would 
provide a direct estimate of the percentage increase in output obtainable from a one 
per cent increase in knowledge stocks, holding all other factors  constant. 
 
In the two-step productivity approach, equation (3) would be rewritten as : 
 
  ln Y - a ln K - b ln L  =  g ln R + s ln Z                                         (4)  
 
Under the additional assumptions that a + b = 1 and that a and b equal capital and 
labour income shares, the left-hand side of (4) equals multi-factor productivity (in 
level, not growth form), as conventionally measured in a growth accounting 
framework. Observations on multi-factor productivity can then be regressed on the 
variables shown on the RHS. 
 
In either case, estimates of the parameter g can be converted from an elasticity to an 
overall rate of return dY/dR as given by: 
 
    dY/dR = g (Y/R).
2                                                               (5) 
 
The capital variable  K  is derived from capital expenditure data by the perpetual 
inventory method: 
 
    Kt   =  (1 - f) Kt-1 + Et-1                                                      (6)    
 
where    Kt   = the stock of conventional capital at the beginning of period t in  
      constant prices; 
    Kt-1 = the stock of capital at the beginning of period t-1; 
    Et-1 = capital expenditure during period t-1 in constant prices; and 
    f      = the depreciation or obsolescence rate of capital. 
 
In this study, Philpott's data on capital employed in different sectors is utilised. 
Philpott does not use diminishing balance depreciation rates but substitutes a 
formula taking in the average life of assets (Philpott 1994).  These estimates of the 
capital employed are about 50 per cent greater than those determined by book 
depreciation methods (Philpott 1995).  
 
The perpetual inventory method is also applied to the R&D variables. The 
expenditures shown in Figure 1 are transformed as in  equation (6). Knowledge is 
regarded as a stock of available technologies which can be added to and subtracted 
from. The reduction process can be treated as the depreciation factor. The initial 
                                                 
2 This is not equivalent to the internal rate of return. The IRR would need to be 
estimated from the long term responses in productivity.  stock of knowledge has to be established from the available data by a formula of the 
kind: 
   
    So =  Eo /  (e + f) ,          (7) 
 
where    So =  the stock of R&D capital at the beginning of the first year for  
      which expenditure data is available; 
    Eo =  the annual expenditure on R&D (in constant prices) during the  
      first year; 
    e   =  the average annual logarithmic growth of R&D expenditures 
for  
      the nearest relevant years; and 
     f   =  the depreciation or obsolescence rate of knowledge. 
 
The assumption is that if the stock had been growing before the first year at a 
certain rate, then the estimate of the total starting stock will be that much higher 
than it would have been if expenditure were capitalised by the rate of depreciation 
alone. In the estimates used in this paper e was estimated for the first ten years after 
1962, and f was set at 5 per cent per year. Thus the starting stock for the market 
sector is: 
 
    So =  $86.3m / (0.1 + 0.05)                                                (8) 
          
         =  $575.3m (in $1982-83)    
 
 The choice of a rate of depreciation of a knowledge stock is a difficult question. It 
seems clear that new inventions and ways of doing things replace older inventions 
and ways. The stock is thus a moving entity - constantly wasted and constantly 
replenished. Evidence is lacking on what is the appropriate course of action. Scobie 
and Eveleens (1986) note that  "average research results are slowly incorporated 
into practice and their impact on productivity increases [in agriculture] reaching a 
peak after 11 years, and finally tailing off after a total of 23 years". This suggest a 
"life" of research of about 20 years with the maximum effect in the mid years of 
that period. Thus a rate of 5-10 per cent might be quite appropriate for a country 
like New Zealand - the results presented here are calculated at 5 per cent. 
 
The second approach is to isolate the productivity change as a residual after capital 
and labour returns have been allowed for.  This is the total factor productivity index 
(TFP) which is defined as the net output of an industry divided by the weighted sum 
of the labour and capital inputs used. In national accounting terms the ratio is: 
 
    TFPi  =  Yi  /  aiLi + biKi        (9) 
 
where ai and bi are the average factor shares of income in nominal terms for the  ith 
industry. For example, in the market sector as a whole the share of L is  0.60 and K 
is 0.40. 
 
The TFP index can be regarded (by re-arrangement of (9) above) as the weighted 
mean of the labour and capital productivity indices:  
    TFPi  =  ai(Yi / Li)   +   bi(Yi / K i).      (10) 
   
The actual data and factor shares from the Philpott data set are available in the 
form: 
   Y it. Real GDP by SNA industry group ($m in 1982-83 prices). 
   L it. Employment in SNA industry groups (`000 full time equivalents). 
  K it. Real gross capital stock by SNA industry group ($m in 1982-83 prices). 
  a i and b i. Average factor shares in nominal $. 
The ratios in equation (10) are shown in Figure 2 for the national market economy 
with base year weights (n.b. excluding owner-occupied dwellings and government 
services). 
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Rates of return to R&D in the Agriculture Sector 
 
We first test the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis (Equations (2) and (3)) in a step-wise 
manner for the market economy and for the agriculture sector(Tables 5 and 6).  The 
variables are: 
Sectoral Real GDP as a function of: 
Labour in full time equivalents (Philpott) 
Real Capital Gross Stocks (Philpott) 
Real Stocks of Private R&D depreciated at 5% 
Real Stocks of Public R&D depreciated at 5% 
Real Stocks of Australian R&D (reflecting a source of external spillovers) 
Real Expenditure on Education in NZ (reflecting upgrading of skills) 
 
In Table 5, hypothesis a. has good properties for expected values for Labour and 
Capital approximating to their factor shares. In hypothesis b. private R&D is highly 
positive but public R&D highly negative. In hypothesis c. both external factors are 
not significant. In Table 6 the Cobb-Douglas fit is very poor; there is again a high 
return to private R&D and a negative return to public R&D; no influence from 
Australian R&D; but a suggestion of an influence from skill levels in the economy.   
 Table 7 shows the regression results derived from equation (4). The dependent 
variable is now total factor productivity as defined in equation (9). Constant factor 
shares (averages) were used as weights for capital and labour inputs. We also show 
the RORs for these results as derived by the formula in equation (5). For MK the 
size of the R&D coefficient is smaller but of the same sign. For AGR the R&D 
coefficients are barely changed from Table 6. Australian R&D comes through as 
significant for MK and AGR and EDU cames through in AGR again.  The ROR for 
PVTR&D is quite high in both equations but the ROR for PUBR&D is low and 
negative.   
Table 5: Full Cobb-Douglas Results for Market Economy 
______________________________________________________________ 
Variable   `Labour‟          `Capital‟  PVTR&D       PUBR&D      AUST            EDU 
Option. 
a.    0.54 (5.2)         0.56 (18.9) 
b.    1.06 (12.5)       0.58 (4.1)       0.70 (4.5)       -0.78 (-7.1) 
c.         0.95 (9.3)         0.37 (1.7)       0.57 (3.5)       -0.59 (-3.6)      0.07 (1.2)     0.03 (0.5) 
 
(`t‟ test in brackets) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 6: Full Cobb-Douglas Results for Agriculture  
Option 
a.    -2.56 (-6.1)      2.42 (8.7) 
b.     0.66  (1.3)       1.63 (2.2)       2.24 (6.3)       -2.01 (-5.7) 




Table 7: Factor Productivity Results for Market Sector&Agriculture 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
      PVTR&D         PUBR&D                AUST                      EDU 
Option 
a.MK      0.39 (3.1)         -0.38 (-3.3)    0.13 (3.7)         
0.02(0.4) 
 
b.AGR      2.91 (6.7)         -2.51 (-6.7)               -0.46 (-2.7)         
0.60(3.7) 
 
c.ROR MK*    $11.9            -$4.8 
 
d. ROR AGR*    $68.7            -$6.7 
_________________________________________________________________________________
__ 
* ROR=Rate of Return; $return per $ of depreciated R&D stock; i.e. accumulated investment in 
R&D. 
 
All of these results utilise stocks of R&D knowledge as an independent variable. As 
already indicated, the stock of knowledge concept is rather hypothetical and its rate 
of wastage or depreciation equally so. Table 8 shows the sensitivity of the results in 
Table 7 to changes in the wastage rate. (There is a small change in the specification 
that changes the earlier result slightly).  It appears that manipulation of the wastage 
rate is compensatory; the elasticity decreases as the wastage rate increases and the 
rate of return rises slightly in each case.      
Table 8:  Sensitivity of Elasticity to the Wastage Rate for R&D Stocks 
(Same formulation as Table 7) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Rate      PVTMK   PUBMK    PVTAGR  PUBAGR 
5%      0.34    -0.35    2.59    -2.32 
10      0.30    -0.29    2.28    -1.98 
20      0.20    -0.20    1.61    -1.46 
30      0.15    -0.17    1.28    -1.24 
40      0.12    -0.15    1.08    -1.11 
50      0.11    -0.14    0.95    -1.03 
Annual      0.07    -0.07    0.69    -0.65 
  __________________________________________________________________ 
       
 
MoRST has been extremely concerned about the negative relationship between 
public R&D stocks and the two productivity measures employed. In terms of the 
industry breakdown employed in the larger study, private R&D stocks are 
positively related to changes in TFP in 7 cases out of 10; public R&D is positively 
related to changes in TFP in 4 cases out of 10; external R&D is positively related to 
changes in TFP in 7 cases out of 10; and education expenditure is positively related 
to changes in TFP in 4 cases out of 10. In the market economy as a whole there is a 
positive result for private R&D stocks and a negative result for public R&D stocks. 
 
As Scobie and Eveleens have shown, there is a relationship between R&D annual 
expenditure over the long term and productivity in AGR.  Table 9 shows the 
relationship in this set of data for the market economy and agriculture sectors using 
TFP as the dependent variable. Since the individual elasticities are additive the 
overall productivity effect of R&D investment can be assessed by this method. In 
both the market economy and agriculture there is now an overall positive relation 
between public R&D and productivity. There is clearly a negative relationship 
between the 4
th and the 9
th year in public investment in both sectors which seems to 
be common to most industries. Private investment in R&D in AGR is positive 
through the system reflecting the high elasticity and rate of return obtained earlier. 
 
Table 9: Polynomial Distributed Lag Effect 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Lag      PVTMK   PUBMK    PVTAGR  PUBAGR 
-1      -0.001    0.130    0.147    0.459 
-2      -0.026    0.045    0.114    0.207 
-3      -0.040    -0.014    0.088    0.029 
-4      -0.044    -0.051    0.070    -0.085 
-5      -0.040    -0.068    0.058    -0.145 
-6      -0.030    -0.070    0.052    -0.160 
-7      -0.016    -0.059    0.049    -0.140 
-8      0.001    -0.040    0.049    -0.094 
-9      0.018    -0.016    0.050    -0.034 
-10      0.035    0.010    0.052    0.032 
-11      0.048    0.034    0.053    0.094 
-12      0.056    0.052    0.051    0.143 
-13      0.057    0.061    0.046    0.167 
-14      0.049    0.058    0.037    0.158 
-15      0.031    0.039    0.022    0.105 
 
Sums      0.096    0.112    0.940    0.736 Turning points    4, 13    6, 13    6, 12    6, 13 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
The assumption that R&D can be conveniently divided into private and public 
providers can be challenged although the insight it reveals is useful as the results so 
far show. Table 10 recalculates some of the main results for AGR with a variable 
amalgamating the components of R&D.  By itself ALLR&D is strongly and 
positively related to changes in TFP. However its strength of asociation is lost when 
regressed with AUST and EDU in the same equation. Curiously the strongest 
relationship is that with Australian stocks of R&D. This is inconsistent with the 
result in Table 6. 
   
 
Table 10: Amalgamation of Private and Public R&D for Agriculture 
___________________________________________________________________
__ 
Option      ALLR&D  AUST    EDU         
a.                                         0.39 (10.4) 
b.      0.25 (0.4)  0.62 (7.2) 
c.      0.06 (0.5)      0.72 (2.8) 
d.                 -0.02 (-0.2)  0.61 (5.9)  0.06 (0.3) 
 
We next examine the source of R&D knowledge employed in an industry. We use 
the agricultural sector as an example. There are two hypotheses to examine. We can 
ask whether the source of R&D knowledge is outside the immediate industry 
environs – in this case such an effect could be called a spillover from one industry 
to another. Secondly we can ask whether the additional source of R&D 
complements the R&D already held or is a substitute for it. We create two new 
variables – PVTOTHER and PUBOTHER – being the stock of R&D not designated 
as belonging to the AGR science output area as defined by MoRST. We then create 
another variable – MULT – which is the geometric sum of the two stocks of R&D. 
A positive sign indicates complementarity and a negative sign indicates substitution 
between own stocks and other stocks. In Table 11 PVTOTHER is not quite 
significant at the 5% level and is certainly of the right sign. PUBOTHER does not 
feature strongly. In the case of MULT the coefficients are negative (indicating 
substitution at work)  but only that for PUBR&D is significant at the 5% level. 
Since PUBR&D by itself has a negative elasticity the MULT result amounts to 
reinforcing the negative effect on TFP.   
 
Table 11: Spillovers in the Agriculture Sector 
___________________________________________________________________
__ 
Optio    PVTR&D  PUBR&D  PVTOTHER  PUBOTHER  MULT* 
a.     1.24 (2.7)  -1.95 (-7.0)  1.14 (1.7) 
b.    1.91 (8.5)  -1.91 (-2.9)      0.41 (0.5) 
c.    2.28 (3.0)  -2.26 (-7.2)  1.05 (1.8)      -0.07 (-
1.3) 




* MULT is a variable representing the multiplicand of PVTR&D and PVTOTHER. See text. 
Likewise for PUBR&D and PUBOTHER.  
Further Econometric Analysis 
 
A more sophisticated approach to the structure of returns in the science system, 
using  the same set of data, is to treat the sectoral data as a cross-section panel 
(Johnson, Razzak & Stillman, 2005). This gives a 9x37 set of observations. The 
function was assumed Cobb Douglas and the data normalised by dividing 
throughout by the labour variable. Hence the results can be interpreted as factors 
which affect labour productivity across sectors in the economy. This variable enters 
the estimating equation on the RHS as output per person lagged by one year and is 
statistically significant. The response to capital per employee is variable and not 
significant in every specification explored.   The results tend to support a constant 
returns to scale hypothesis. Across industries, the elasticity of private R&D stocks 
is positive in all regressions tried, but the own effect of public R&D stocks is 
negative and barely significant. Spillovers were tested by including each industry 
R&D stock as an independent variable.  This measures the effect of a given industry 
stock on all other industries. For private R&D there were measurable spillovers 
from building, forestry and services and for public R&D smaller spillovers from the 
agriculture and transport industries.  These results confirm the simpler statistical 
models where private R&D has a small positive impact on own-industry output 
after controlling for capital and labout inputs, and some evidence that this R&D 
spills over from certain industries to the overall economy. Publicly provided R&D 
does not appear to have a positive impact on either own-industry output or the 
overall economy.  These results are consistent with economic theory in the sense 
that private R&D investments should be more efficient as private firms will not 





Table 12: Foundation Cost-benefit Studies
Subject Authors Methodology Results
1. Possum Control Outcome Management Public Good paradigm IRR  28%
   Landcare Services (M Rosevear) `Economic agents who gain
or lose'.
2. Mobile Radio Network Infometrics Qualitative assessment No IRR
   Development Private costs and benefits Pvt B/C 2:1
   Tait Electronics
3. Post-Harvest Treatment of  NZIER Developer's perspective IRR  30%
   Carrots  (C Nixon) Private viewpoint? B/C  2.5:1
   Plygers (Developer)
4. Vitamin B12 Deficiency NZIER Social cost benefit IRR  41%
    Remedy (M Cox) `Large and diverse economic B/C  10:1
    Ag Research benefits'
5. Speedwell Cattle Vaccine N/A N/A N/A
    (forthcoming)
Source: www.frst.govt.nz/evaluationa positive return. On the other hand, publicly provided R&D often has goals beyond 




Table 12 shows the results of cost-benefit studies on a project basis undertaken by 
FRST. While these may be possibly `successful‟ projects, they have longer track 
records that permit evaluation. The results are generally very favourable. It is not 
clear to me whether the methodology is always the same in each case study. There 
is a need to be clear about private returns and social returns to investment and 
whether national income conventions are being observed. We should look forward 




The results obtained by myself  and Johnson et al are drawn from a single set of 
data. Some of the R&D data is drawn from surveys in the period from 1989 to 
2000, while some of the R&D data is extrapolated from less reliable sources for the 
earlier period. National income, labour employment, and capital stock are drawn 
from the data base set up by B.P.Philpott which is consistent for the whole period of 
study. The allocation of R&D expenditure to a particular industry relies on the 
MoRST system of `science output areas‟ where providers try to identify the 
probable users of that research. Before 1989, public expenditure on R&D was 
gleaned from Government and NRAC records and the industry allocation depended 
on the department carrying it out. For private expenditure on R&D the allocation 
was roughly in line with that found in 1989. 
 
For these reasons, the association between R&D expenditure and particular 
industries is weak in the data. The set for the market economy is stronger in this 
sense because these allocation errors are avoided. The difference between the 
results for PVR&D and PUR&D in both studies appears to be partly due to these 
measurement errors and partly due to a conceptual difference associated with the 
aim of scientific research. The latter is perhaps best encapsulated in the notion of 
short-term versus long-term investment strategies. The state, perhaps, has set 
scientific objectives, in the past, that aimed at the national good in a longer term 
framework. The results of such research permeate into society rather slowly and 
unevenly. It may be virtually unmeasurable! On the other hand, we would expect 
private enterprise to invest in areas where there was a forseeable gain for them. 
(This is pure hypothesis of course, given the measurement errors in `science output 
areas‟). 
 
The analysis does demonstrate, I think, that it is the general pool of knowledge 
which is important in the economic utilisation of scientific research rather than any 
special designated research. Maybe we should stop looking for spillovers (between 
industries say) and accept that knowledge is a general resource available to anyone 
apart from where particular patents or ownership restrictions apply. It might be 
important to bear in mind Griliches (1979) definition where he says “The level of 
productivity achieved by one firm or industry depends not only on its own research 
efforts but also on the level of the pool of general knowledge accessible to it”.  
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